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Ian Hunt: 'Uriel Orlow: In
Concert'
Published in Performance,
exhibition catalogue (St Prex: Wings, 20006), pp. 2-5.
We are accustomed, when thinking
about memory, to move between questions of personal memory
(which we do not always adequately understand as socially implicated)
and the larger question of cultural memory, which we find physically
exemplified by on the one hand ceremonies and rituals, and
on the other by libraries, writing, archives and whatever technologies
of storage – books, magnetic tape, computers, the internet – are
current(1). Uriel Orlow's investigations of these themes have
taken him already to the Wiener Library (which began its life
as the actions of a counter-propagandist, not as a memorial)
to make interviews with those working there, to accompany video
footage of every foot of its shelves. It has also taken him
to the National Archives at Kew, where, in a collaborative
work made with Ruth Maclennan, the camera adopted the point
of view of a document on the automated track used to retrieve
and distribute documents for historians and researchers.
Inevitably, there is traffic between our understanding of
personal memory and our current understanding of cultural
memory, archives,
and their contemporary technologies. But leaving aside for
a moment the controversy of whether a dynamic mental function
such as memory can at all be helpfully understood via the
metaphor of the brain as any kind of 'store' (this intuitively
appealing
idea is supported by few who have considered the problem),
there are notable, but still relatively little observed and
theorised aspects of how memory is transmitted and conserved.
For memory is also inscribed corporeally, through repetition
and performance. When getting on an escalator or moving walkway
for the first time, children worriedly concentrate, stumble
or jump; when the skill is mastered, they walk with unbroken
stride over the division. The ease is learnt. Swimming, typing
or texting – this last an ability most of us have only
recently acquired – are only the most visible of the
many things we have learnt to do so successfully that we often
forget that we have, indeed learnt them. These habit memories,
so little thought of, are revealed as vital when they are lost
through stroke or mental impairment; and yet they may also
survive when other cognitive functions do not, as languages
spoken in childhood are often observed to return in extreme
old age. Orlow himself became interested in these areas 'through
fascination with neurological research into brain-damaged musicians
who despite being unable to remember anything or anyone (not
even themselves) can still play music' (Art Monthly 298, July-August
2006, p.13).
There is a reason why in films about
musicians, directors cut between the actor seated, hands hidden
at the keyboard
(though
looking ill at ease), and the disembodied hands of a real,
unknown musician. Musicianship, where grace and precision
in physical movement come together with reading as the
way in
which a piece of music is realised, interpreted and internalised,
has naturally been a focus of interest in the study of
memory. Maurice Halbwachs (in 'La mémoire collective
chez les musiciens', Revue philosophique, mars-avril 1939)
considered
part of the problem in this way:
'Let us now consider, once again, the musicians who play
in an orchestra. They all have their eyes fixed on their
scores,
and in this way their thoughts, like their gestures, come
together, because these can be regarded as so many copies
from the same
model. Let us suppose that they all possessed sufficient
powers of recall, such that it was possible for them to
play without
looking at these pages covered with signs, or to no more
than glance at them from time to time. The scores are there.
But
they could equally well not be present. If they are not
present, nothing will alter, since the musicians' thoughts
accord,
and the scores have no other part to play than to symbolize
the
concurrence of their thoughts . . . '
In Concert, made with two musicians from the Royal
Academy of Music, London, does away with not only the score
(internalised
in both the memory and in the physical movements of playing),
but the instruments. The first movement of Shostakovich's
First Cello Concerto, op. 107, is performed by a cellist,
and by a pianist. We do not see their faces, though we
assume
they see each other exactly as they would normally. They
play to
a recording they have themselves made, which is thus both
a performance and a kind of score for the performance they
are
now making; and thus definitively more than an act of mime.
Absorbed by the performance, we become almost unaware that
no instruments are present. And then there is an unforgettable
pause when the cellist rests both hands on her knees and
the invisible cello, made so present by her gestures, disappears. In
Concert is a speculative artwork, not a formal study
of cognition. But artworks share with science the occasional
need
for thought-experiments, and this one presents evidence
of
a further development of Orlow's work, that exceeds by
far in effect and fascination what the initial premise
suggests;
not least by its social and mimetic implications and pleasures.
The non-musician, seeing and hearing this work, is tempted
to imitate, if only in a restrained way, some of the movements
made by those who have learnt them so well.
(1) See Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, Cambridge:
CUP, 1989.
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